

# Navigating by Falling Stars: Monetary Policy with Fiscally Driven Natural Rates

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# Determination of long-term inflation in the standard New Keynesian framework

- Natural Rate

$$r^* = 1/\beta - 1.$$

- Taylor rule:

$$i_t = \bar{r} + \bar{\pi} + \phi(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}).$$

- **Long-term inflation determination:** If the central bank sets  $\bar{r} = r^*$ , then it can achieve its inflation target  $\bar{\pi}$ .

## What happens in a heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model?

- In a HANK model, the natural rate is a function of the stock of debt  $\bar{B}$ :  $r^* = r(\bar{B})$ .
- Debt-financed fiscal expansions then act as “natural rate” shocks.
- To achieve its target, the central bank must adapt its monetary policy to the long-term fiscal stance  $\bar{r} = r(\bar{B})$ .

## Preview of findings

- There is a minimum level of debt compatible with the inflation target.
- If the central bank does not adapt its monetary policy to a permanent fiscal expansion, then long-term inflation will be higher.
- Compared to a RANK model, short-term dynamics are more inflationary even if the central bank adjusts, due to income effects.
- Robust monetary policy rules à la Orphanides-Williams perform much better in this environment than Taylor rules.
- We can infer the *policy gap* between the central bank intercept  $\bar{r}$  and the natural rate  $r^*$  using market data.

**Model**

# Model overview

## 1. Heterogeneous households

- Mass 1 of households, subject to idiosyncratic labor productivity.

## 2. New Keynesian block

- Unions are similar to intermediate goods producers in a NK model.
- Sticky wages: they set wages on behalf of workers.
- Yields a simple wage Phillips curve.

## 3. Monetary and Fiscal Policy

- Central bank follows a Taylor rule.
- Treasury follows a fiscal rule.

## 4. Firms

- Representative firm with aggregate production function.
- Flexible prices.

# Households

- Households solve:

$$V(a_{i,t}, z_{i,t}) = \max_{c_{i,t}, a_{i,t+1}} u(c_{i,t}) - v(n_{i,t}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t[V(a_{i,t+1}, z_{i,t+1})]$$

$$\text{s.t. } c_{i,t} + a_{i,t+1} = (1 + r_t)a_{i,t} + (1 - \tau) \frac{W_t}{P_t} z_{i,t} n_{i,t} + T_t,$$

$$a_{i,t+1} \geq 0.$$

- They choose  $c_{i,t}$  and  $a_{i,t+1}$ . Their labor choice  $n_{i,t}$  is performed by unions.

- |                              |                           |  |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| ○ $c_{i,t}$ : consumption    | ○ $r_t$ : return of bonds | ○ $z_{i,t}$ : idiosyncratic productivity |
| ○ $n_{i,t}$ : working hours  | ○ $W_t$ : nominal wage    | ○ $T_t$ : net transfer                   |
| ○ $a_{i,t}$ : asset position | ○ $P_t$ : price level     |  |

## Treasury: Fiscal Policy

- The treasury can issue one-period nominal bonds. Tax collection is given by:

$$\mathcal{T}_t = \int_0^1 \tau \frac{W_t}{P_t} z_{i,t} n_{i,t} di.$$

- Public debt  $B_t$  accumulates according to:

$$P_t B_t = (1 + i_{t-1}) P_{t-1} B_{t-1} + P_t (G_t + T_t - \mathcal{T}_t).$$

- Fiscal rule:

$$G_t = \bar{G} - \phi_G (B_{t-1} - \bar{B}).$$

- $G_t$  : government consumption
- $\mathcal{T}_t$  : tax collection
- $\bar{B}$  : debt target
- $B_t$  : public debt



## Central bank: Monetary Policy

- The central bank follows a Taylor rule:

$$\log(1 + i_t) = \max \left\{ \log(1 + \bar{r}) + \log(1 + \bar{\pi}) + \phi_{\pi} \log \left( \frac{1 + \pi_t}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right), 0 \right\}.$$

- $\bar{r}$  : real rate  
intercept

- $i_t$  : nominal rate
- $\bar{\pi}$  : inflation target

- $\pi_t$  : inflation

## Firm

- Representative firm with linear aggregate production function:

$$Y_t = \Theta N_t.$$

- Flexible prices:  $W_t/P_t = \Theta$ .

- $Y_t$  : output
- $\Theta$  : constant productivity
- $N_t$  : aggregate labor

# Unions

- Wage Phillips curve:

$$\log \left( \frac{1 + \pi_t^w}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right) = \kappa_w \left[ -\frac{\epsilon_w - 1}{\epsilon_w} (1 - \tau) \frac{W_t}{P_t} \int u'(c_{it}) z_{it} di + v'(N_t) \right] N_t + \beta \log \left( \frac{1 + \pi_{t+1}^w}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right)$$

- Proportional allocation of labor:  $n_{i,t} = N_t$

- $\pi_t^w$  : wage inflation
- $N_t$  : aggregate labor
- $W_t$  : nominal wage
- $P_t$  : price level

## Aggregation and market clearing

- In equilibrium all agents optimize and the labor, bond, and good markets clear:

$$\begin{aligned}G_t + C_t &= Y_t, \\A_t &= B_t,\end{aligned}$$

where aggregates are:

$$\begin{aligned}N_t &= \int_0^1 z_{i,t} n_{i,t} di, \\A_t &= \int_0^1 a_{i,t+1} di, \\C_t &= \int_0^1 c_{i,t} di.\end{aligned}$$

# Calibration

Parameter	Value	Target/Sources	
Fiscal policy			
$r$	Real interest rate (annual)	0.01	Baseline case
$\bar{B}$	Debt target	2.8	Debt-to-GDP 70%
$\bar{G}$	Government spending target	0.2	Spending-to-GDP 20%
$\tau$	Tax rate	0.277	Taxes/GDP in 2022
$T$	Net transfers	0.07	$B$ constant in DSS
$\phi_G$	Coefficient in the fiscal rule	0.1	Baseline case
Monetary policy			
$\phi_\pi$	Taylor rule coefficient	1.25	Standard
$\bar{\pi}$	Inflation target (annual)	0.02	Standard

# Monetary-fiscal interaction in the long run

## Natural rate determination

- Demand for bonds:


$$A_{ss}(r^*) = \int_0^1 a_{i,t+1} di.$$

- Supply of bonds:

$$B_{ss} = \frac{(\bar{G} - G_{ss})}{\phi_G} + \bar{B}.$$

- Assume  $\phi_G > 1/\beta - 1$ ; then the supply of bonds is:

$$B_{ss} = \bar{B}.$$





Deviations from the natural rate in the Taylor rule (policy gap) imply deviations of long-term inflation from the objective

$$\pi_{ss} \approx \bar{\pi} + \frac{r^* - \bar{r}}{\phi_{\pi} - 1}.$$



## There is a minimum debt level compatible with price stability



Steady-state nominal interest rate and inflation for different inflation targets

**A surprise debt-financed fiscal expansion**

## Description of the exercise


- The economy starts out at a steady state. At  $t = 0$  there is a surprise increase in  $\bar{B}$  from 70% of GDP to 80% of GDP (MIT shock).
- The fiscal authority lets the fiscal rule do its work, but adjusts  $\bar{G}$  to pay for the cost of the additional debt burden (necessary for the existence of a new steady state).
- These changes are common knowledge to all, including the central bank.
- The central bank adjusts  $\bar{r}$  in its Taylor rule and sets it equal to value of  $r^*$  in the new steady state to avoid inflation above its target in the long run.

## Long term impact

	Initial steady state	New steady state		Difference	
		HANK	RANK	HANK	RANK
Bonds (% GDP)	70.00	80.00	80.00	10.00	10.00
Real interest rate	1.00	1.16	1.00	0.16	0.00
Nominal interest rate	3.02	3.19	3.02	0.17	0.00
Output	100.00	99.90	99.96	-0.10	-0.04
Consumption	80.00	80.16	80.07	0.16	0.07
Govt. consumption	20.00	19.74	19.89	-0.26	-0.11
Tax revenue	27.70	27.67	27.69	-0.03	-0.01
Primary surplus (% GDP)	0.70	0.93	0.80	0.23	0.10


**Table 1:** Steady state in the baseline HANK model and in the RANK model

## Short term impact




Dynamics after a surprise debt-financed fiscal expansion

# Decomposition of the response of inflation and consumption in terms of policy variables




Inflation



Consumption

# **Validating evidence and the policy gap**

## The response of the natural rate to a permanent increase in debt is quantitatively similar to simulations of the model



### IRF of $r^*$ to a 1 pp increase in the government debt-to-GDP ratio

*Note:* We estimate an LP with  $r_{t+h}^* = \alpha_h + \beta_h D_{t-1} + \mathbf{x}_t \gamma_h + u_{t+h}$  and plot the regression coefficient  $\beta_h$  (the solid line) associated with the lagged public debt-to-GDP ratio  $D_{t-1}$ . We use the natural rate estimated by Lubik and Matthes (2015) as our measure of  $r^*$ . The control variables  $\mathbf{x}_t$  include four lags of the change in  $r^*$ , three additional lags of the public debt-to-GDP ratio, and four lags of the federal funds rate, the GDP deflator, and the unemployment rate. The shaded areas represent the 68% and 90% confidence intervals using Eicker–Huber–White standard errors.



## Inferring the policy gap from market data

- From the Taylor rule in the DSS and the Fisher equation we obtain:



$$\pi_{ss} \approx \bar{\pi} + \frac{r^* - \bar{r}}{\phi_{\pi} - 1},$$

- If  $\bar{r}$  is constant, then the policy gap can be computed as

$$r^* - \bar{r} = \frac{\text{cov}(r^*, \pi_{ss})}{\text{var}(\pi_{ss})} (\pi_{ss} - \bar{\pi}).$$

- With this equation we can infer the policy gap from market data.

## Inferring the policy gap from market data




Long-term nominal and real rates and inflation


Policy gap  $r^* - \bar{r}$

Note: Daily data.  $i_{55}$  is the 5y5y forward nominal rate obtained from the zero-coupon U.S. yield curve.  $\pi_{55}$  is the 5y5y ILS.  $r^*$  is computed as the difference  $i_{55} - \pi_{55}$ . The dashed vertical line marks the date when the 2% inflation target was announced (January 24, 2012).

## Correcting for the term premium



Data adjusted for term premia




Policy gap  $r^* - \bar{r}$  (adj. data)

Note: Monthly data. The estimated term premia are removed from market data using the methodology described by Hördahl and Tristani (2014). The dashed vertical line marks the date when the 2% inflation target was announced (January 24, 2012).


**Thank you!**

Parameter		Value	Target/Sources
Preferences			
$\sigma$	Elasticity of intertemporal substitution	1	Standard
$\varphi$	Frisch elasticity of labor supply	0.5	Standard
$\nu_\varphi$	Disutility of labor parameter	0.791	$N_{ss} = 1$
$\beta$	Quarterly discount factor	0.992	1% real interest rate in DSS
Income process			
$\rho_e$	Persistence income process (annual)	0.91	Floden and Lindé (2001)
$\sigma_e$	Std. dev. idiosyncratic shock (annual)	0.92	Floden and Lindé (2001)
Production			
$Y$	Quarterly output	1	Normalization
$\Theta$	Constant level of TFP	1	Normalization
$\kappa_w$	Slope of the wage Phillips curve	0.1	Aggarwal et al (2023)
$\epsilon_w$	Elasticity of substitution	10	Standard

# Decomposition of the response of aggregate consumption



HANK model



RANK model

## Heterogeneity and inflation


- Expressing the Wage Phillips curve as an infinite discounted sum:

$$\log \left( \frac{1 + \pi_0}{1 + \bar{\pi}} \right) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \kappa_w \left[ -\frac{(\epsilon_w - 1)}{\epsilon_w} (1 - \tau) \int u'(c_{i,t}) z_{it} di + v'(N_t) \right] N_t.$$

- $\int u'(c_{i,t}) z_{it} di$  : cross-sectional average of marginal utilities
- $v'(N_t)$  : labor disutility
- $N_t$ : hours worked or employment

# Heterogeneity and inflation


- Decomposition of the response of inflation on impact:



- $\int u'(c_{i,t})z_{it}di - u'(C_t)$ : consumption heterogeneity measure



## Extensions: Robust monetary rules




Comparison of a standard Taylor Rule and Orphanides-Williams Rule in the HANK model

## Extensions: Alternative fiscal policies


- Endogenous tax rate
  - **Government consumption** and **net transfers** remain **constant**. The treasury adjusts the tax rate  $\tau$  each period so that the evolution of public debt replicates the evolution in our baseline analysis.
- Lump-sum net transfers:
  - **Government consumption** and the **tax rate** remain **constant**. The treasury adjusts net transfers each period so that the evolution of public debt replicates the evolution in our baseline analysis.

## Extensions: Alternative fiscal policies



Dynamics after a surprise debt-financed fiscal expansion

## Extensions: Anticipated effects




Dynamics of an anticipated debt-financed fiscal expansion


# Extensions: A model with long-term debt, plain

[▶ back](#)

Decomposition of the response of inflation and consumption in terms of policy variables



Inflation




Consumption

## Extensions: Robust monetary rules


- An alternative to adjusting the intercept in the Taylor rule would be to use a monetary policy rule that does not require knowing the value of the natural rate.
- Orphanides and Williams Rule (2002):  
This rule links the **change** in nominal interest rates  $i_t - i_{t-1}$  to the deviation of inflation from its target  $\pi_t - \bar{\pi}$ :

$$\log(1 + i_t) = \log(1 + i_{t-1}) + \phi_\pi \log\left(\frac{1 + \pi_t}{1 + \bar{\pi}}\right)$$

# Alternative fiscal policies: comparison with the RANK model




HANK



RANK

# Fiscal surplus in different steady states



Fiscal surplus